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The emergence of full-fledged reforms in Kenya from the introduction of the 
Retirement Benefits Authority in1997 has rekindled hopes among the ageing population in 
Kenya. These reforms are geared towards creating good social welfare conditions for 
Kenyans. 
The Kenyan Pension industry remains a significant growth area which needs structural 
changes in management and governance in order to meet the ever changing scheme member 
needs. This is what forms the basis of the NSSF Act 2013. 
In this study the effect of the NSSF Act contribution rate has been examined through use a 
Contribution rate model. Additionally, Kenyans’ perception towards the yet to be 
implemented NSSF Act has been observed by use of questionnaire analysis. 
These reforms are directly linked to the general economic growth of the country. The study 
asserts that the set 6% contribution is sufficient to meet the welfare conditions of Kenyans. 
This has been supported by majority of the stakeholders (scheme members, administrators 
and fund managers among others) however; good implementation strategies need to be put in 
place in order for the public to realize the good effects of the same. 
This study therefore seeks to identify the main social welfare reforms put in place, as well as 
find out the effects and challenges towards implementation of these reforms on the 
performance of the industry with a critical theoretical look at the NSSF Act 2013. 
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Introduction 
Over the past three decades, the living condition of older persons in Kenya 
hasdeteriorated. This is as a result of the erosions of their economic power, changes in the 
family structures and roles, particularly on the care of older members of the immediate family 
unsustainability of the pension schemes and inability of government to fulfill her expected 
role in the care and support of older persons in the community (Reynaund, 2000). Worldwide 
older persons are regarded as vulnerable group, hence, it has been accepted that older 
persons, the children and women are in dare need of government attention. This is because 
poverty affects this class of people than any other categories in contemporary world 
especially in developing countries. Various efforts by various successive regimes in the 
country to address the needs of older members of the society have proved abortive. We have 
seen several organizations coming in to rescue the situation. A good example could be World 
Health Organization which helps supply food for this unfortunate group of individuals. 
However, the emergence of full-fledged reforms on introduction of Retirements Benefits 
Authority (RBA) in 1997 has rekindled the hope of older persons especially because the 
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regulatory body has been keeping a close check on retirement programs in Kenya to ensure 
the pension industry operates with high levels of efficiency. 
Kenya being a British colony has adopted so much from the British system of saving. 
Among many includes the formation of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), which is 
similar to the state pensions of the United Kingdom (UK). In addition, the setting up of 
occupational pension funds in Kenya is borrowed from the UK (Mghali, 2003).  
Ginneken (1998) Refers to social security as benefits that the society provides to 
individuals and households through public and collective measures to guarantee them a 
minimum standard of living and to protect them against low or declining living standards 
arising out of a number of basic risks and needs. Whereas pension benefits are only paid to an 
individual or his family on the basis of that person's employment record and prior 
contributions to the system, social security schemes incorporate welfare, of which financial 
assistance is extended by the state to persons who qualify on the basis of need. Social security 
is thus a social insurance program. For our case in Kenya we have NSSF. 
The question of how to use social policies to link successful economic development 
with effective poverty reduction is at the core of contemporary political debate especially the 
fact that social security sector is one of the key players in the pension industry. The social 
security after retirement concerns for the Kenyan work force is a factor that leads to growth 
of the pension industry. This has been so because a large task force of the Kenyan population 
is increasingly being employed in the private sector which has designated occupational 
pension schemes for the employees. There is need to replace income after the active working 
years for a person who has been used to a pay check at the end of every month. Reforms to 
improve the efficiency of the social security sector are therefore highly needed. A vast 
understanding about the operations and implications of these laws is highly needed thus the 
basis of this report. The dilemma of efficiency of these reforms with regards to the pension 
industry is a big question to all stakeholders. The NSSF Act 2013 being one of the biggest 
impasses to Kenyans has elicited a lot of industry reactions from all corners. The Act 
proposes a raft of measures that aims at enhancing the old age financial security in Kenya. 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the impact of reforms on both private and 
the social security system in Kenya. 
The specific objectives are to: 
1. To identify the main reforms put in place for the Kenyan pension industry with a 
critical look on the NSSF Act 2013. 
2. To identify the possible impacts of these identified reforms. 
3. To identify the challenges towards implementation of these reforms. 
Since the above developments are very crucial, it therefore calls for high level of 
professionalism and technical skills to evaluate the impacts of the bill before it is 
implemented; this is because the proposed changes in the bill tend to change the whole 
pension industry operation mechanism. The changes in the regulatory environment also mean 
that the sector has to change significantly to comply with the new requirements. This 
therefore must have a significant impact on the performance of the pension industry in 
Kenya. 
Section 1 summarizes the background study, Section 2 presents an overview of 
previous work together with case studies of some other countries which have had pension 
reforms, Section 3 summarizes the contribution rate model, Section 4 describes the analysis 
of data followed by a discussion of the research findings and finally section 5 gives discusses 
research findings which are based on the objective of analyzing the impacts of pension 
reforms. Highlights about study limitations and recommendations for practical and further 
research are also given. 
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Related literature 
The need for reforms in social security is a question being impressed by many 
countries around the world. The OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría asserts that “Further 
reforms are needed that are both fiscally and socially responsible. We cannot risk a 
resurgence of old-age poverty in the future. This risk is heightened by growing earnings 
inequality in many countries, which will feed through into greater inequality in retirement.” 
This struggle to meet the above addressed issue is the main reason as to why many countries 
are reforming their pension industry.  
 Some of the theories in support of pension reforms include the permanent income 
hypothesis by Friedman, (1957) which investigated pre-and post-retirement living standards 
in “straightening out the consumption stream”. It hypothesized that individuals base their 
consumption on a long term view of an income measure, perhaps a notion of lifetime wealth 
or a notion of wealth over a reasonably long horizon. The basic hypothesis posited is that 
individuals consume a fraction of this permanent income in each period and this is the 
average propensity to consume would equal the marginal propensity to consume. 
The lifecycle hypothesis by Modigliani, (1963) deals with economic decisions on 
retirement saving in particular the rationalization of an individual’s income in order to 
maximize its utility over his lifetime. It stated that households accumulate savings during 
their working careers up to their retirement, and de-accumulate wealth thereafter. This type of 
saving behavior enables households to smooth their marginal utility of consumption over the 
lifecycle. Their achievement laid primarily in the rationalization of the idea in to a formal 
model which they developed in different directions and integrated within a well-defined and 
established economic theory. This model assumes the following assumptions about human 
behavior. They are forward looking across the span of their lifetimes; they can predict the 
financial resources they will have over their lifetime, they understand something about the 
financial resources they will need in successive periods of their lives, they make informed 
choices about the use of their financial resource. 
 Other investigators have found that delegation of authority within the pension 
industry to the agents may result in the agent taking actions that are not in the principal’s best 
interests (i.e., that are acts of self-interest on the part of the agent) but which are unknown to 
the principal. The goals of agency theory are to constrain agents from acting improperly and 
to provide them with incentives to act appropriately. The goal conflict problem results when 
the principal and the agent have different goals and it is difficult (and/or expensive) for the 
principal to monitor the agent’s behavior (to ensure appropriate behavior) (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The source of the conflict can be the self-interest of the agent or simply different attitudes 
toward risk. 
Some of the recently  realized reforms worldwide include the Chilean model of 
pension reform of 1981 replaced an earlier pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) and public pension 
system with a new compulsory system of individual funded and privately managed pension 
accounts based on Defined Contribution (DC) principles was credited for linking old age 
social security with the facilitation of macroeconomic growth. World Bank personnel in 
particular suggested that the Chilean case proved that a shift of pension provisions from the 
public to the private sector and from PAYGO to DC would maintain social protection while 
increasing economic growth via the deepening of financial markets (World Bank, 1994). The 
Chilean reform proved to be much less successful than was originally assumed. Although the 
Chilean system succeeded in making a large share of workers formally subscribe to 
individual funded pension accounts, the level and length of contributions and subsequent 
expected pension payments remained on average quite low (Feldstein, 1998). In fact, the 
system delivered poverty pensions rather than old age security to most contributors. In 
reaction to the coverage gaps of the funded system, the former center-left Chilean 
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government decided to phase in a new public and tax-financed basic social pension system  in 
order to provide additional income for current and future pensioners with very small funded 
pensions (Riesco 2009). 
Secondly came the Nigerian 2004 reform which was inspired by the experience of 
Chile, an economically more advanced country, Nigerian policy-makers attempted to 
replicate the 1981 Chilean pension reform Orifowomo 2006; Casey, 2009. Before the 2004 
reform in Nigeria, the formal private sector was covered by a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, 
the Nigerian Social Insurance and Trust Fund (NSITF). However, its scope and coverage 
were more limited than those of public sector schemes. Only some larger enterprises offered 
access to the scheme and, since its foundation in 1994, the NSITF’s accumulated capital and 
pension payouts were low while administrative costs were high (ILO 2006). The resulting 
pattern of pension provisions was highly fragmented, and the available data suggest that only 
10 percent of the Nigerian workforce (about 4.8 million out of about 48 million) belonged to 
the Formal employment sector, out of which about 3.7 million also belonged to a pension 
scheme (Casey, 2009). The main draw-back being the implementation challenges. 
In the same year (2004) we also had the UK pension reform. This reform also 
stipulated that all employers were obligated to offer a qualifying workplace pension scheme 
and automatically enroll eligible employees with an increase in contribution rates. (Taylor-
Gooby, 2005). 
 On the Kenyan scenarioOdundo, (2003) report on Supervision of public pension funds 
in Kenya he points out some of the loopholes in the Kenyan social security system. He points 
out the fact that the fund is faced with numerous challenges that are deeply entrenched in the 
operations of the scheme and which negatively impact investment returns. One of the main 
challenges is the fact that our investment profile is characterized by a lack of diversity: an 
overwhelming 72 percent of assets far greater than the recommended 30 percent are held in 
real property. Returns from these assets are low, and liquidating them would offer little relief 
since the property market is depressed and the likelihood of recovering costs is poor. Further 
Odundo, (2003) points out the fact that NSSF Kenya is faced with poor record keeping. This 
has led to delays in determining benefits precipitating a US$100 million unallocated suspense 
account.  
The afore mentioned issues have led to a number of strategies being put in place to try 
and better the operations of NSSF first the Retirement Benefits Act has been introduced in 
part to address these issues by requiring the adoption of international fund management 
practices. Also on the part of management the introduction of the trustee training requirement 
in 2011 is also a big step that will ensure that the scheme funds are managed appropriately. 
On the regulations part, RBA also calls NSSF to be compliant with its regulations as the 
regulator of all retirement benefits schemes in Kenya. The above concerns have also led to 
the major pension reform in Kenya; the proposed 2012 NSSF bill. 
More authors include Fultz, (2006) who also assesses the impact of pension reforms 
by comparing pre- and post-reform replacement rates, but includes a fuller treatment of the 
possible effects of this decline in generosity on poverty rates. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Kenya has so far had a number of pension reforms. Below is a pictorial representation 
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Contribution rate model 
Model Definition 
The objective of a pension model is to evaluate the financial viability of a pension 
scheme or pensioner to confirm the income and expenditure that should remain in force over 
a definite period of time or make recommendations on the necessity to revise the contribution 
rate to maintain a sustainable benefit (Latulippe, 1997) 
 
Model Assumptions 
Assume:   
1. salary amount S 
2. Interest rate r 
3. Salary increase rate e 
4. Assuming an individual would like to maintain a given lifestyle after retirement 
his/her salary is expected to increase constantly at a rate𝑟𝑠. 
5.  Monthly effective will be 𝑟𝑚 =(1+𝑟𝑠)1/12 -1 
A mortality table will then be prepared from the principle; qx =  1 − PX 
Table 1 below shows values used for the specific assumption; 
Table 1 
Assumed Age of Entry 25 
Assumed Retirement age 60 
age of the ,member at date of valuation 30 
Rate of pension accrual 80 
Rate of Pension Increase 5.00% 
Assumed annual salary growth 1.50% 
Interest Rate 18% 
Inflation Rate 7.36% 
 
Table 2 
Male Percentage 67% 
Female Percentage 33% 
Salary level Min Max 
Males $4,011 $14,815 
Females $4,411 $11,024 
 
Dollar - Kshs Conversion Rate 90 
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The model also incorporated mortality assumption; that is the Association of Kenya 
Insurers (AKI) tables were used. 
 
Model Specification 
The main objective was to determine the appropriate contribution rate that the 
individual can use to contribute an amount that will be able to sustain him/her during the 
retirement period. This was by use of a contribution rate model whereby a hypothetical 
situation of an average earning Kenyan was considered. 
All the contributions were accumulated to age 60 years and the expected pension 
benefits discounted to age 60 years, using excel functionalities. An appropriate standard 
contribution rate that can make the difference between the individual contributions and 
his/her benefits equal to zero such that he/she does not under or over contribute was 
calculated. The model was meant to give an approximate estimate of the appropriate 
contribution rate to help compare with the proposed 6% in the proposed bill.  
The model made use of the following pension standard contribution rate formulas; 
 
Attained Age Standard Contribution Rate (AASCR) 
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑅 = (𝑅−𝑋)𝑆𝐴 ×�1+𝑒1+𝑖�𝑅−𝑋×𝑎𝑅′
𝑆×𝑎𝑅−𝑋⌉��������     (1) 
Where: 
 R= Assumed Retirement Age 
 X=Age of member at date of valuation 
 S= Salary at date of valuation 
 A= Rate of pension Accrual 
 E= Assumed annual earning (salary) growth 
 I= Discount Rate 
 𝑎𝑅1= Value of Annuity payable from age R (Allowing for any spouses pension and 
pension increases) 
𝑎𝑅−𝑋⌉��������= An annuity to determine the present value of all future earnings (Allowing for 
the timing of contributions and salary increases) 
 
Entry Age Standard Contribution Rate (EASCR) 
𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑅 = (𝑅−𝐸)𝑆𝐴 ×�1+𝑒1+𝑖�𝑅−𝐸×𝑎𝑅′′
𝑆×𝑎𝑅−𝐸⌉��������      (2) 
Where: 
E=Assumed Entry Age aR−E⌉�������=An annuity to determine the present value of all future earnings for a new 
entrant. aR′′ =Value of annuity payable from age R, Based on Assumed Proportion of males and 
females in the scheme (Allowing for any spouses pension and pension increases) 
 
Projected Unit Standard Contribution Rate (PUSCR) 
𝑃𝑈𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 1×𝑆𝐴 ×�1+𝑒1+𝑖�𝑅−𝑋×𝑎𝑅′
𝑆×𝑎1⌉�     (3) 
Where:  a1⌉� =an annuity to determine the present value of earnings over the next year 
(Allowing for the timing of contributions and salary increases) 
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Current Unit Standard Contribution Rate (CUSCR) 
𝐶𝑈𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 1×𝑆×(1+𝑒)𝐴 ×� 11+𝑖�𝑅−𝑋×𝑎𝑅′ +(𝐶𝑈𝐴𝐿×𝑒)







𝑅−𝑋 × 𝑎𝑅′    (5) 
 
Data analysis, discussions and findings 
The data 
  Data was obtained from self-administered questionnaires, completed by 50% of 
respondentsfrom different pension schemes in Kenya. Secondary data was obtained from 
various researches done on the Kenyan pension industry. 
 
Data Analysis and findings 
  The main aim of the contribution rate model was to establish if 6% contribution is a 
good rate for Kenyans since this is the most crucial part of the act which has created tension 
in the industry. 
  From the four funding methods of valuation of pension standard contribution rates the 
6% line graph seems to be the average for all the four methods. This implies that the stated 
contribution rate in the act could be fair and is note lean on any particular individuals. 
  The six per cent deduction is not to be imposed on employees immediately but will be 
increased gradually over the next five years. Employers will also be required to match the 
deduction by every employee. 
  An average employee changes jobs at least seven times during his or her working life. 
Under the current law, he can access up to 75 per cent of his pension contribution.  
 
Attained Age Method 
In Attained Age Standard Contribution Rate (AASCR) method, the model targets a 
stable level of contribution which can then be adjusted as appropriate with adjustment in the 
model parameter (age, salary retirement etc.)  The model assumed that benefits are expected 
to be paid over the expected future membership of the beneficiary thus will accumulate to the 
value required to provide the benefits that are expected to accrue. The model results for 
different corresponding salary increases and interest rates are as shown below. 
This method gave a total contribution rate of 10.33%.This is to mean 5.16% employer 
contribution and the same rate also applies to the employee contribution. The deviation 
between the model result (5.16%) and 6% percent could be as a result of other extra scheme 
expenses like the regulatory levy and scheme administrative expenses. 6% could be a good 
contribution rate according to Attained age method. SeeFigure 2 and Table 3 on the 
appendix. 
 
Entry Age Method 
The calculation for Entry Age Standard Contribution Rate (EASCR) is similar 
Attained age Standard Contribution Rate above. The only difference is that for this method 
the calculations are performed at the beginning of the member`s service period. In this case 
the entry age assumption (25 years) was used. The method gives a total contribution rate of 
11.6% as highlighted below. This is to mean 5.8% employer contribution and the same rate 
also applies to the employee contribution. These results are on average in agreement with 6% 
in the NSSF Act. See Figure 3 and Table 4 on the appendix. 
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Projected Unit Method 
In this method the Projected Unit Standard Contribution rate (PUSCR)was calculated 
by getting the present value of all benefits that will accrue in the year following the valuation 
date, by reference to service in that year and projected final earnings divided by the present 
value of all members earnings in that year. In this case the standard contribution rate is based 
on a one year time period. The method gives a total contribution rate of 11.92% as 
highlighted below. This is to mean 5.86% employer contribution and the same rate also 
applies to the employee contribution. These results are on average in agreement with 6% in 
the NSSF Act. SeeFigure 4 and Table 5 on the appendix. 
 
The Current Unit Method 
The Current Unit Standard Contribution Rate (CUSCR) was modeled by getting the 
present value of all benefits that will accrue in the year following the valuation date by 
reference to service in that year and projected earnings at the end of the particular year 
Plus the present value of all benefits accrued at the valuation date in respect of members in 
service, multiplied by the projected percentage increase by the projected percentage increase 
in earnings over the next year divided by the present value of all members earnings in that 
year. All divided by the present value of all member`s earnings in that year. 
See Figure 5 and Table 6 on the appendix 
 
Different stakeholders’ perspective about Impacts of pension reforms in Kenya 
  Scheme Membersconcerns include expressed fears that whereas there is an opt-out 
clause in the Act, it could prove hard for companies to get the necessary waiver to run their 
own schemes. Stakeholders are of the opinion that the requirements for applying for the 
waiver are expressly provided for, as is the timeline for any inquiry. Besides, the application 
will be made directly to the Retirement Benefits Authority (RBA) and thus NSSF will have 
no role in it. 
  As the country moves towards implementing the proposed reforms, the NSSF will be 
expected to operate three funds the current provident fund, the new pension fund and a new 
provident fund.  
  Fund Managers - A higher contribution as expressed by some respondents means an 
additional expense on employers and may affect the new employment – thus erasing the need 
to create about one million jobs promised by the Government. Fund managers are of the 
opinion that the new law will enable the NSSF to be professionally managed by external fund 
managers thus promising better returns for members. Once the law is in place a lot of people 
who have been left out under the current scheme will come on board. Indeed, if an emerging 
economy like Kenya wants to foster ‘sustainable and inclusive growth’ fight poverty and 
reduce inequalities, the Government needs to provide a social safety net for its population. 
  Otherwise, if that is not done people will fall back into poverty again and again 
because of substantial income reductions due to social risks, including sickness, 
unemployment and old age. But how will a country like Kenya, which struggles with an 
increasing informal sector, non-registered and some mobile population, establish social safety 
nets such as a pension system for a billion-plus population? Pension reform is one of the most 
difficult challenges in Kenya’s economic reforms which require innovative public policy 
solutions primarily at the national government level 
  The old provident fund will be given five years to settle its dues to members, after 
which it shall be closed down. East Africa has been looking for ways to reform its pensions 
sector. 
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  NSSF Perspective -NSSF research justifying the need for NSSF’s transformation 
depicts that only 3.1% of elderly in Kenya above the age of 55 had reported receipt of any 
pension. Such statistics, pointed out confirm the growing need for NSSF to transform into a 
statutory national pension scheme to stem the growing incidences of poverty amongst the 
elderly which is currently much higher than the national average incidence of poverty. 
 
Factors other than the ones indicated as determinants in the questionnaire that affect 
the performance of the pension industry in Kenya? 
  From the respondents some factors other than the determinants already identified 
came out strongly as some of the other factors which may influence the financial performance 
of the schemes. 
  The trustees considered the global economic conditions as crucial in determining how 
the Kenyan economy is going to perform. They cited the recent 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis which affected the general world economy .This crisis also shrank the gains which had 
been made by the retirement benefits schemes as most investments incurred losses. 
  The respondents also deemed it important to analyze the political situation in the 
country before investing in any sector. They gave an example of the post-election violence 
and how it affected the stock market negatively affecting the schemes financial performance. 
  The long term strategies adopted by the scheme determine the strategies to be adopted 
by the fund managers in investing the schemes funds. This goes a long way in delivering 
good returns to the scheme. 
 The trustees cited the government regulations as some of the factors which affect the 
performance of retirement benefit schemes. Some regulations cited was where the 
government allowed deferred members to withdraw some of their benefits before retirement. 
This occasioned losses in some schemes’ since the funds had been locked up in long term 
investments. 
 From the questionnaires it was clear that already 86.5% of the sample data are 
registered members of NSSF. Of which 23% are satisfied with NSSF services. Some of the 
reasons given for satisfaction include the fact most people are aware of the tax benefits 
pegged on their NSSF contributions. Some of the positive aspects highlighted include the fact 
that all employees including self-employed persons can participate in the social security. 
Article 43(1) (e) of the Constitution states that every person has the right to social security. 
There are also various tax incentives such as exemption from the payment of stamp duty of 
any benefit or the refund of any contribution. Benefits payable by the Fund or from a 
contracted-out scheme are also generally exempted from income tax and contributions are 
also made tax-deductible expenses. Provision is also made for Reciprocal Arrangements with 
countries both within and outside of the East African Community. The provisions that 
exclude contributions from attachment, including in bankruptcy proceedings, are 
commendable for their intention to insulate the retired against poverty. Most of the 
respondents are confident that NSSF will benefits will do help them meet their retirement 
needs. 
On the other hand, some of the reasons given for those who are not comfortable with 
the act include their past bad experience with the old NSSF scheme. Respondents pointed out 
the fact that the act has several negative provisions that would impact on the retirement 
benefits industry and increase unemployment. It came out clear that the act  re-establishes a 
statutory fund with no clarity as to whether it is to take the form of a trust or a body corporate 
and the reference to “pension” schemes rather than “retirement benefit” schemes limits the 
opt-out option to pension schemes. The NSSF Board of Trustees is set up as a body corporate 
thereby causing confusion and ambiguity as to whether the Fund is established as a statutory 
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fund or as a trust. Furthermore, the NSSF Board comprising two principal secretaries, seven 
cabinet secretaries and a managing trustee appointed by the Board will be largely appointed 
by the Government. The Bill makes occupiers of premises liable to inspection and any 
employer, servants and agents of such occupier, and any employee, shall be required to 
furnish a Compliance Officer all such information and documents for inspection. This is 
notwithstanding Article 31 of the Constitution that grants natural and corporate persons the 
right to privacy including the right not to have their person, home or property searched; 
information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed. The 
Second Schedule to the Bill provides for the compulsory transfer of members from the old 
provident fund to the new fund, but prohibits the transfer of assets, including members’ 
contributions, to the new fund. 
  Misappropriation of funds and mismanagement of investments come out clear from 
most of the respondents. According to the report by Auditor General, NSSF may have 
incurred up to 76.5% of contributions on administration fees. It is on this premise that is act 
has attracted scrutiny and criticism from most of the stakeholders. 
  Transparency of the act is one of the major concerns raised by the respondents. It is 
clear that stakeholder education is needed as most of the respondents as much they are so 
emotionally negative about the bill they seem not to understand the key aspects of this bill. 
Most of the respondents were not able to clearly state what the bill states. One thing that 
came out clear is that most respondents are aware of the increase in contribution rate though 
they cannot really explain how the increase is to be incorporated. With lack of awareness, 
most stakeholders pointed out the fact that the Bill risks creating greater confusion in the 
retirement benefits sector.  As part of a solution for the same the respondents are of the 
opinion that there awareness sessions should be organized in order to enlighten the public. 
60% of the respondents are both members of NSSF as well as private pension. 
Members are fascinated with the tier 11 option of opting out as this will help grow their 
private pension. Specifically the private pension administrators are of the opinion that this 
will help grow their industry as most of their trusted members will go for the opting out 
option. It is of concern to them that this provision of contracting out of regulations referred to 
in the Fourth Schedule, are yet to be prescribed and therefore employers cannot benefit from 
the said provisions. The CEO of RBA in his reports said that though the Bill has room for 
employers with sound benefit schemes to opt out of the mandatory NSSF contributions, the 
conditions for opting out have not been well defined under the proposed law. This is what 
brings tension to private pension holders as they are not sure if the provision may be made 
not to be in their favor hence stands a chance to lose out. 
The opt-out provision of the NSSF Act 2013 is evidently a blessing as indicated by 
private pension scheme members. Members are of the opinion that in opting out one may use 
the opportunity to set up a private pension scheme account, take advantage of contributions 
beyond Tier 2, which are available to all members of private pension schemes as well as 
diversify your retirement savings investment strategy. Some of the reasons given as to why 
they want to remain in their private schemes included:  
• Increased transparency on reporting and investing 
• Ease of accessing account statements 
• Ease of managing contributions beyond Tier 2 
• Ease of managing third party pension transactions, such as mortgage guarantees. 
• Ease of accessing pension benefits upon attaining retirement age 
• Portability of the pension scheme 
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Impacts of Pension Reforms on the Kenyan Pension Industry   5 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Summary 
Positive aspects of the NSSF Act 
The NSSF Act 2013 does not necessarily claim private pension scheme to lose. There 
will still be money. Private schemes will continue to receive Tier II contributions if they are 
contracted out of NSSF, in addition to any extra contributions made by members. The 
accrued balances over the previous years will also continue being invested. Further, 
companies that do not have private schemes are allowed to contribute Tier II deductions to 
either personal or umbrella schemes that have contracted out of the NSSF. The graduated 
nature of the new mandatory pension scheme means that in the second year, NSSF will 
calculate the 6 per cent deduction on 100 per cent of the national average earnings. In the 
third year, the Upper Earnings Limit will be two times the national average earnings. In the 
fourth year, it will be three times average earnings, and in the fifth year, the upper earnings 
limit will be capped at four times the national average income. The reason for this is to ensure 
contributions move with the economic times. So the figure contributed will vary, depending 
on what the national average earnings will be then. However, for Tier I contributions, lower 
earning limits have been fixed at Sh6,000, Sh7,000, Sh8,000 and Sh9,000 from 2014 to 2017, 
respectively. 
 
Concerns about the Act 
Some of the fears include the fact that NSSF is taking the risk of taking what people 
earn today and ensuring they are better off a few years down the line requires prudent 
investment, which is something many analysts and workers fear NSSF cannot do. 
“Restructuring the NSSF scheme is something to welcome, especially for those workers 
without private pension schemes, who are in the majority. The higher the amount they 
contribute, the better the benefits they get. But NSSF must sort out its governance issues. 
Further, the provision that employees cannot access their pension until they reach retirement 
age is set to be particularly unpopular with the younger generation of workers who regularly 
change jobs. If you get the money when you retire, you could die soon, and the family you 
leave behind will find it difficult to get your benefits. Having that money now is much better. 
 
Increased Responsibility to NSSF Stakeholders 
The NSSF ACT 2013 which has   replaced the NSSF ACT (Cap 258) has introduced 
new responsibilities for the employer with respect to NSSF contributions. The execution of 
these tasks calls for caution because of the implicit cost of error within the provisions of this 
new law. In addition to the existing financial and administrative roles under the old NSSF 
ACT, the introduction of Tier I and Tier II categories of contributions imposes operational 
and fiduciary responsibilities on the employer. These are new roles and fiduciary 
responsibilities can often by omission lead to adverse outcomes. The financial responsibilities 
are increased because the employer now has to pay more money to the benefit of the 
employee.  
In addition the employer has to ensure contributions are remitted promptly 
particularly to avoid incurring heavy penalties as implied in the provisions of this new Law. It 
is primarily also the duty of the employer to now manage the remittance of Tier II 
contributions and where there is contracting out, the employer is to operate the separation of 
Tier I and Tier II contributions. This duty is important because of the need for competitive 
investment performance on Tier II over Tier I.  
Small differentials in investment returns carried over several years can have very 
large implications on the final value of pension benefits. Moreover based on precedents 
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elsewhere in many cases the accurate reporting of both Tier I and Tier II contributions by the 
employer is an important factor in mitigating employment compensation and benefits 
disputes whenever they have occurred. 
Some of the proposals arethat the NSSF Board first addresses the key administrative 
and governance issues within the organization prior to implementing any radical changes. 
Further, there structured scheme ought to embrace acompetitive market driven economy and 
not a doptmonopolistic tendencies which hare against the law. Following the above concern 
about the implementation process, stakeholders are of hope that the recent postpone of the 
implementation date from 1 Jan 2014 to 31 may 2014 will help put things in place.  
The Act by adopting a wide definition of employee and employer compels every person in 
any   form of employment to join the scheme. APAK is concerned that this  may lead  to a 
Monopolistic Universal  Pension (albeit an occupational scheme  in  set-up) scheme  without  
the  critical  Government’s contribution  for every citizen  using tax  which is a crucial  
component to any scheme  providing “Universal Pension  Benefits  for all  citizens  in  a 
country”.  The ILO Convention provides that universal schemes be funded by the state and 
are not contributory therefore in essence the Act shall be in contravention with internationally 
accepted industry best practice. 
This mandatory membership of persons to the scheme violates Articles 36(2) of the 
Constitution that safeguards a person’s right not to be compelled to join any association of 
any kind. It is therefore noteworthy that all citizens and not just a few members of NSSF 
should be accessing state funded social security albeit in the long-term.  
 
Integration of NSSF ACT and third Parties 
Various stakeholders in the  pension sector propose the development of  the   National 
Social Security  Policy  with the NSSF being one of the pillars with its role confined to  
providing cover  to  the  vulnerable sector  of  the  society as  envisioned by article 43(1)  (e) 
of the Constitution or managing the scheme as  a scheme of last resort  for members 
(employees)  without  any  membership in any  occupational retirement scheme or  leave 
NSSF to  be  one of  the   occupational pension/provident schemes  for employed persons 
who  do  not subscribe to any other scheme registered under  the RBA Act. 
This approach will also be in line with  the models adopted by  other East African 
States  who have  liberalized  their   pension  sector  with  the 1st    Pillar  Schemes offering 
just but a safety net  for the vulnerable in the society. As such, persons already enrolled in a 
pension scheme ought not to be compelled to join the scheme (NSSF) as this would amount 
to a violation of their rights.  Tanzania  has adopted a similar  approach where the NSSF 
Tanzania  is under the supervision and regulation of the Tanzania Regulatory Law  and 
operates as just but one of the many occupational  retirement benefit  schemes and competes 
with  other statutory  and non-statutory  funds.  NSSF Kenya should not it seeks to unlawfully 
tout the NSSF Board as a judge/regulator of all other retirement benefit schemes. 
It  is  important  to  separate  and  respect  the  regulatory  role  of  the Retirements  
Benefits  Authority  as  mandated by  the RBA Act  No. 3 of 1997 with   the mandate  of  the 
NSSF.   Applications ought to be heard and determined by the RBA as the independent 
oversight authority. It is the Association’s submission that Reference Scheme Test has not 
been outlined in the said schedule and that the RBA ought to be empowered to set and 
adjudicate which schemes meet universal criteria.  The NSSF cannot be the Judge and Jury in 
its own case.  The  RBA Act  clearly  empowers  the Authority  to independently  regulate the 
activities  of  retirement  benefit  schemes. The Cabinet Secretary in charge of matters of 
Social Security ought NOT to assume the role of the Authority. 
The Tier I, II   & III   fund system should be well outlined and made easy to 
understand the nature of the scheme as provided for in the Act.  APAK recommends that a 
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simple illustration of the scheme be   adopted    to   avoid   the   scheme   being   subject to   
different interpretations thereby causing confusion in the industry. 
 
Limitations to the Study 
The research experienced a number of constraints while undertaking the research. The 
major limitation was the limited literature available on similar work done in Kenya. Most of 
the literature references were from western countries such as, United States and European 
countries that had carried out various studies related to this one. 
Lack of adequate resources (time, finances) meant that the researcher was limited to a 
few areas of research. The lack of resources meant the researcher could not be able to reach 
to all the service providers of a pension scheme to be able to get a feedback from them on the 
determinants of schemes financial performance. 
The respondents felt they needed to be thoroughly educated on the area of study 
before they could fill the questionnaire. Some of the trustees expressed the concern that they 
did not have data for their schemes since most of the data was with the appointed service 
providers. 
There was a poor response in terms of filling in the questionnaires. Out of the sample 
population only 50 % filled the questionnaires even after numerous follows by email and 
phone calls. This reduced the sample population though it was still representative. 
 
Conclusion 
Reforms will always be welcome. I laud efforts by the forces driving the changes in 
NSSF. We support especially the drive to at least ensure that the benefits that NSSF provides 
to Members at their retirement are meaningful and if this is the only way Members can secure 
their retirement, so be it. For employers who have adamantly refused to allow their Members 
to enjoy the benefits of having their own occupational retirement benefits schemes, the new 
Fund will at least create a platform that will allow worker feel like their retirement welfare is 
at last secure. The current move to conform NSSF to the provisions of the Retirement 
Benefits Act is also long overdue and should be encouraged. It is hoped that investment 
returns will continue to increase as the administration costs reduce or at least arrested. 
However, we must reiterate the need for NSSF (at least in the mutated form) will be 
fully compliant with the Retirement Benefits Act and more so that its management will be 
required to accept the complete oversight of the Retirement Benefits Authority. This will 
inject professionalism, transparency and accountability 
There is therefore a need to engage all the stakeholders in the pension’s 
industry/sector so as to allow them air their views on the Act and have their   contributions 
incorporated. This is in line with good Corporate Governance and industry best practice. 
It is further opined that consequent to the Bill, the RBA Act  No.3 of 1997  ought to 
be amended  to provide that all  employers  must enlist  their   employees  in  a retirement  
benefit  scheme  of  their   choice  or  the  NSSF. This is in line with international best 
practice industry standards.  Consequently, the Retirement Benefits Authority (RBA) should 
be mandated to FULLY oversee the activities of NSSF in accordance with the provisions of 
the RBA Act; 
The Pension Industry seeks a fair competitive environment where each player is given 
a freehand to offer service to members in the retirement industry. 
According to the ILO, Universal Pensions are basically 1st Pillar social assistance 
measures formulated and funded by the state. A major element of the scheme is “Government 
or State Funding’ through taxation measures so as to avail social security benefits to ALL 
persons and not just persons in employment.  The social assistance is most critical to persons 
who cannot afford to support themselves and usually takes the form of social programmes 
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such as Income Support or un- Employment Support, housing, medical aid etc. to persons 
who are vulnerable to a society. This is the basis of the Act. 
  
Suggestion for Further Research 
The present study should be replicated to include pension scheme members in other 
regions of the country to find out whether the same results will be obtained. The sample size 
should also be increased to get a more representative sample and make better conclusions. 
The study should also be replicated to include Kenyans working in the informal sector 
and find out if they save for retirement and how they save, either through personal pension 
plans or by saving in the bank. 
The study can be carried out to include those who have already retired or who are 
above the age of 60 years as this study was limited to those below 60 years of age. 
A broader research could be carried out to measure the impact of a reform on an 
individual’s total net worth. This study would require greater resources and would require at 
least 3 years in order to educate individuals and measure the impact. 
A study could also be carried out to determine what role policy makers can play, if 
any, to increase efficiency in the pension industry. 
 
Policy Recommendations 
Based on these research findings the following are the recommendations to the 
various stakeholders. 
The trustees of pension schemes should engage the services of a professional 
consultant to draft policies to guide the investment manager on the investment strategy of the 
scheme. This policy should take cognizance of the age structure of the employees and the 
various risk appetites for the employees. This will help in matching the assets and the liability 
profile for the scheme. 
The trustees should also have a risk mitigation policy in place. The various inherent 
risks should be identified through consultative forums to identify them and also mitigate their 
effects. The trustees should also have a trustee liability cover to reduce their risk in case of 
any litigation issues which may arise. 
There should be a policy in place to guide the government in policy making. The 
process should be consultative to ensure that the interest of the stakeholders is considered in 
making the regulations. 
Policies with regard to NSSF investment strategies should be put in place in order to 
realize good return from expected increase in fund as a result of increase in contribution rate. 
Information sessions and seminars should be conducted in order to enhance member 
education before implementation of the Act in June. This will help reduce levels of mis-
conception among scheme members and employers. 
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Appendix I: Questionnaire 
Questionnaire on the impacts of reforms on the kenyan pension industry 
Section one: general information 
 
1. Are you a member of NSSF Kenya? 
Yes 
No 
2. Do you have a private pension scheme? 
Yes 
No 
3. At what rate do you contribute to your private pension schemes? 
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Section two: Pension reforms 
 
5. In general, what are the main elements that have been addressed in the recent 








7. Do you support the proposed increase in the rate of contribution in the proposed 




8. Using a scale of 1-5 to represent the level of agreement where 1 represents totally 
disagree and 5 represents totally agree indicate your level of Agreement with the 
issues addressed in the bill by ticking the most appropriate box as related to the 
following statements? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The proposed 6% is good and will translate 
into an increase in members benefit.      
The proposed bill will benefit the private 
sector.      
The bill is consistent with the Kenyan 
constitution      
NSSF investment strategies are good      
 
9. What are some of the aspects of the bill you agree with and should they be 




10. What improvements should be done to improve the bill and improve the 





Is the proposed bill inconsistent with any other regulations within the pension 
industry? Please explain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
